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Mack Ott
BREE years after its enactment, controversy still
surrounds the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA) and its successor, the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). On the one hand,
the Reagan administration claims that the 1981 tax
reductions substantially increased U.S. business in-
vestment and contributed to the strong recovery from
the 1981—82 recession’. On the other hand, somecom-
mentators argue that the tax reductions have failed to
increase business investment.2 Moreover, other critics
of ERTA argue that, although investment has in-
creased, it has done so in an unbalanced fashion: too
fewresources are going into plant, while toomany are
going into producers’ durable equipment.’ Omitted
almost entirely from the debate over the effectiveness
of the tax reductions has been the independent im-
pact of the recent disinflation. That is, to what extent
would investment havebeen increased simply by the
decline of the inflation rate and how does such an
influence come about?
This article develops the foundation for assessing
these issues. First, the economics of depreciation de-
ductions is discussed. Second, depreciation account-
ing is reviewed. Third, the legislatively enacted effects
of ERTA and TEFRA are set forth. Following this, the
relation of U.S. capital investment to distortions in
depreciation and inflation during the last three de-
Mack Ott is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Sank of St.
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lEcoJrJmic Reportofthe President (1984), p. 34.
‘For example, see Editorial, Washington Post, April 22, 1984>
‘Greenhouse (1984)>
cades are reviewed. In each ofthese steps, the partic-
ular impact ofa declining inflation rate is examined to
weigh its relative importance in changing the invest-
ment incentives due to depreciation deductions from
taxable income.
THE ECONOMICS OF DEPRECIATION
DEDUCTIONS
In the course of any business activity, equipment
and plant gradually are consumed: equipment wears
out from use or becomes obsolete and must be re~
placed; structures deteriorate, ultimately requiring
renovation or demolition and reconstruction. Conse-
quently, depreciation is a normal expense of business
activity and, like other normal expenses — wages and
salaries, insurance premiums, utilities and material





An inherent difference between depreciation and
other deductible business expenses, however, is that
depreciation can be determined only implicitly; other
~From the institution of the federal income tax with the sixteenth
amendment to the Constitution in 1913, depreciation has been an
allowable deduction in computingtaxable income. Under the Reve-
nue Act of 1913, taxpayers were allowed to deduct “a reasonable
allowance forthe exhaustion, wear and tear ofproperty arising out of
its use or employment in the business>’ Internal Revenue Service
(Vol.1971-2), C.B. 504.
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expenses can be substantiated explicitlyby such posi-
tive documentation as invoices.
Two distinct types of economic value loss are cov-
ered by depreciation: First, there is tile obvious deteri-
oration due to use which lessens the remaining value
in producers’ durable equipment and structures. The
rate ofsuch deterioration is difficult toestablish objec-
tively becausewear and tearon a given type of equip-
ment or structure may occur at different rates in dif-
ferent applications. Second, there is the economic
value that is lost when either an improved machine is
developed — that is, better quality of output, faster
rate of output or more frugal in its input usefor agiven
output rate — or a change in the relative prices of an
input (such asenergy) occurs that requires achange in
production techniques and equipment design. Al-
though the economic loss due to obsolescence is obvi-
ously difficult to predict, it has been a tenet of busi-
ness income tax procedures resulting in the
acceleration of depreciation since well before the ex-
plicit adoption of accelerated depreciation account-
ing systems in 1954.’
To establish an explicit basis for depreciation ex-
penses, then, the taxing authority could either allow
each firm to estimate its own current depreciation
expenses or provide guidelines in the form of some-
what arbitrary schedules of allowable percentage de-
ductions. For the first 20 years of the federal income
tax, individuals were given the freedom to determine
their own depreciation allowances subject to IRS re-
view.The U.S. taxcode nowprimarily takesthe second
approach.’
Elements of Depreciation
Thereare three elements ofdepreciation expensing
impliedby theforegoing discussion, only twoof which
are explicit in the depreciation schedules: First, there
is the length of time, the asset’s ta~¶e, over which
5See Internal Revenue Service, p. 505.
‘For example, the original IRS Bulletin F of 1920, which set forth
depreciation guidelines, clearly allowed the freedom to choose (and
imposed the burden to substantiate) depreciation deductions both
for deterioration and obsolescence:
The Bureaudoes not prescribe rates to beused in computingdeprecia-
tion and obsolescence, as it would be impractical to determine rates
which would be equally applicable to all property of a general class or
character> For this reason, no table of rates is published> The rate
applicable and the adjustment ofanycase must depend upon the actual
conditions existing in that particularcase, (Internal Revenue Service, p.
505, note 13>)
From 1934 onward, however, this procedure was tightened in large
part due to the declining prices of replacementcapital. In response to
crIticism (and proposed legislative action), the Treasuryswitched to a
the asset, for tax purposes, is assumed to deteriorate?
Second, there is the pattern of deductions; this com-
ponent determines the acceleration of the deprecia-
tion schedule, which varies from equal deductions in
each period — no acceleration — to proportionally
large initial-period deductions, which decline accord-
ing to specified accounting patterns over the asset’s
tax life. Third, there is the problem of how to treat
scrapor salvagevalue. Given thedifferences indeterio-
ration that existin different applications, this problem
would exist even if tax life and useful life were equal.
In general, tax lives are shorter than the durability
implied by the rate of physical deterioration so that
scrap value — more particularly, after-tax scrap value
— is a problem for all capital users. Moreover, the
longer the physical life ofan asset, the more uncertain
itsscrap value; technological advance, changes in rela-
tive prices of inputs or evolution in use patterns may
make the market value at disposal much less than the
value itnplied by its remaining physical life given its
original purchase price. For example, a 30-year-old
industrial building may be physically sound but of
little value because of a change in regional industrial
use, demographic changes or- a shift in transportation
methods.
Therefore, both the shortening of tax lifetimes and
the acceleration of depreciation deductions can be
economically rationalized as approximating the ac-
tual wear and obsolescence patterns of assets. More-
over-, as discussed in the next section, acceleration
may offset an asset’s rising replacement cost due to
inflation, though the more pragmatic rationalization
usually advanced is that acceleration orshortened tax
lives provide inducements to investment.’ In anycase,
procedure requiring substantial documentation to support the opera-
tional as opposed to the procedural validity of depreciation deduc-
tions. Ibid, p. 505.
7At least since 1956 (and perhaps as early as 1942), the Internal
Revenue Code’s provisions for depreciation have been moving from
a physical concept of asset life to a useful life, where the latter is
intended to accord with business practice rather than a potential
period of use. Ibid., p. 506. In general, the useful life would be shorter
than physical life due to obsolescence, optimizing of salvage value
and thebenefits of replacing theasset when its net economic valueof
output,while still positive, declines below that of a replacement asset.
‘For example, President Kennedy argued that the shortening of tax
lives by 30—40 percent in 1962 (by an administrative not a legislative
procedure) was justified in spite ofthe large revenue loss because of
the investment impact:
Business spokesmen who have long urged this step estimate that the
stimulus to new investmenl will be far greater — perhaps as much as
fourtimes greater— than the $1 >5 billion Irevenue lossl made available>
In any event, it is clear that at least an equal amount will go intonew
incomeproducing investment and eventually return to the Government
in tax revenues most, it not all, of the initial costs> Ibid., p. 507>
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the concomitant gain at disposition ofthe fullydepre- companying tnsert. Assuming that tax life and useful
ciated asset,scrap value, ts treated as ordrnatyincome life are equal, the impact of accelerated depreciation
to the taxpayer.’ accounting is to return the invested capital to the firm
earlier in the asset’s life than under straight-line d -
DEPRECIJ% ION ACCOUNTING preciation, thereby r ducing the impact of inflation.
Asa result of the higher depreciation deductrons, the
Ihe 1954 tax code explicrtly authorized a variety of taxable proportion of the asset’s income is reduced
accelerated depreciatton accountingmethods. sumof
the years’ digits and variations on declining balance ________________________________________________
methods.b0 These methods are described in the ac- ever, In contrastto the 1 954 tax code which allowed the taxpayer to
use declinrng balance methods, the 1946 IRS rulIng mposed the
burden of proof on the taxpayer:
The declIning balance method ol computing depreciatIon would be
Economic Recovery Tax Actof 1981, p 1 88 approved forfederal tax purposes, provided it accordedwith the method
of accounting regularly employed in the books of the taxpayer and
“As early as 1 946, there was recognition that declining balance resulted in reasonable depreciation allowances andproper reflectionot
depreciation could bnng accounting practice closer tothedetenora net income for the taxable year or years ,nvolved> lEmphasis addedl,
tion and obsolescence rates implicit in businessorganization; how- Internal Revenue Service p 505, note 14FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1984
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This raises the present value ofthe asset’s anticipated
after-tax income stream relative to its price. Conse-
quently, increasing depreciation deductions should
induce a higherrateofinvestment, all otherthings the
same.”
Graphically, this early return of capital can be seen
in chart Iwhere theremaining undepreciated value of
an asset with a 10-year taxlife is displayed. The unde-
preciated orremaining value is shown for fourdepre-
ciation accounting methods: straight line (SLl, 150 per-
“Thetheoretical foundationsforthis exist in a variety of sources: Hall
and Jorgenson (1967) is the classic reference and Nelson (1978)
provides a clear exposition of the issues most germane to this
article. Auerbaoh (1983) surveys theliterature on corporate finance
as it relates to taxation and the cost of capital. Kopke (1981) ad-
dresses the choices confronting tax policymakers regarding the
most effective form of tax reductions to stimulate investment>
cent declining balance (150 DB), 200 percent declining
balance (200 DB) and sum oftheyears’ digits (SYD). As
a benchmark, the remaining economic value — the
asset’s initial value less cumulated deterioration — is
also plotted; economically, the asset is assumed to
deteriorate atan exponential 10 percentrate — that is,
in inverse proportion to its original useful life. Note
that the depreciation schedules all provide for an ear-
lier return of capital than warranted by physical dete-
rioration alone. This occurs for two reasons: First,
since the physical deterioration is a fraction of the
declining balance, it will never consume the asset;
there will always exist apositive scrap value.” In con-
i2If an asset’s economic deterioration is proportional — e.g., geomet-
ricor exponential — it will always have a scrap or salvage value at
the end of any finite period. For example, if the asset’s output
delerioratesatarateb, 0<S<1, andhasataxlifeN= 1/6, thenthe
0 1 23 4 5 67 89 1 0
Year
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trast, depreciation schedules are designed to exhaust
the asset’s value over its tax life. Second, the acceler-
ated schedules take a larger portion of depreciation
earlier than does the asset’s decay rate.








This inverse relation ofdepreciation and tax life holdsfor a variety of
assets under the ADA system — for example, autos (6 = .333,
N 3), railroad equipment (8~ .066, N = 15) and metal working
equipment (6 = .1225, N 7.8). Gravelle (1982), table 1, p. 8. Even
when 8>1/N, however, there will be a positive scrap value. For
example, aircraft(6=1818, N=92) and office, computing and ac-
counting equipment (8= .2729, N-7.0) have Ss about twicetherecip-
rocal oftheir respective Ns for which S would be about 1/8: S =e~
e~2=.135>
Despite the apparent excess of depreciation over
economic decay depicted in chart 1, accelerated de-
preciation accounting is insufficient to provide forre-
placement ifthe rate ofinflation is high enough. Chart
I implicitly assumes a zero inflation rate in that eco-
nomic decay is displayed relative to a historical pur-
chase price.
Chart 2, drawn with the remaining value adjusted
for an inflation rate of 9 percent, illustrates the impact
of inflation on the relation ofeconomic and account-
ing measures of depreciation. This has the effect of
pivoting each of the accounting depreciation profiles
counter-clockwise around the zero-time intercept
due to the rising nominal price of the replacement
asset relative to its historical nominal purchase price.
At a 9 percent inflation rate, the $1,000 purchase price
ofthe asset will rise to $2,367 over its 10-year tax life.
Consequently, at any point in the asset’s 10-year tax
life, asmaller portion ofthe real replacement cost (the
economic remaining value) is recovered with a high
0 1 2 345 6 7891 0
Year
0
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THE CHANGES DUE TO ERTA
AND
‘to evaluate the combined effects of accelerated de-
preciation, inflation, sclap value and shortened tax
lifetimes, we first examine the depreciation schedules
applied to assets under the assumption that tax lives
and economically useful lives are equal. In this exami-
nation, presented in table 1, the relative adequacy of
depreciation deductions is assessedfor assetsof 3- 5-,
10-, 15- and 30-year durabilities. The table also incor-
porates one final complication — the investment tax
credit.
Since 1962, the investment tax credit (ITC) has been,
in effect, asecond form ofaccelerated capital return in
the tax code. In principle, because it is a return of
capital at the end of the asset’s initial tax year, tTC
augments the depreciation deduction; adjusting for
its being a credit rather than a deduction can be ac-
complished bydividing by the tax rate.’
Each entry in table I is the sum of the real present
discounted value of the tax-deduction equivalent of
the investment tax credit plus the depreciation de-
ductions plus the after-tax anticipated proceeds from
the sale ofthe asset (scrap value) in ratio to thepresent
discounted value ofthe replacement cost of the asset.
A real after-tax interest rate of 3 percent was used in
the computations.’3 The entries are computed over a
“The inflation effect is symmetric: rising prices lower the value of
depreciation deductions and falling prices raise it. Consequently, it
is not surprising that in 1934, during a periodof sustained deflation,
legislation was introduced in Congress to lower depreciation allow-
ances> Internal Revenue Service, p. 505, note 10>
“For the first two years after its introduction, the depreciable base of
an asset was reduced by the credit; from 1964 to 1982, no such
reduction was required> In 1982, the enactment of TEFRA has
restored a reduction in the depreciation base — by 50 percent of the
credit> ITC is currently 10 percent of the asset’s price in the case of
equipment with a tax life of five years or more and 6 percent for
shorter-lived equipment; structures, generally, are not eligible for
ITC, although some equipment associated with structures and cer-
tain low-income housing does qualify. Tax Equity and Fiscal Respor7-
s/bility Act of 1982, pp. 41=43.
“This is the commonly used rate in the literature, going back to Hall
and Jorgenson (1967) and continuing through Kopke (1981)>
Gravelle (1982) uses 5>5 percent following Hendershott and Hu
(1981); all of the ratios reported in this article were also recomputed
with a 5>5 percent real rate, and neither the qualitative nor quantita-
tive results using 5>5 percent were appreciably different.
range of inflation rates typical of those experienced
during the last three decades. The higher the inflation
rate, the lower the real value of the depreciation de-
ductions since the deductions are based on a fixed
nominal value — the historical purchase price of the
asset. In contrast, the denominator is unaffected by
inflation since it is cast in real terms to measure the
declining value in production of the asset. Note that
these are actual, not expected, inflation rates> It is the
actual inflation rate that determines whether depreci-
ation deductions will be adequate to provide for the
replacement asset; however, as this implies, the higher
the expected inflation rate over the asset’s life, the
lower the value ofthe asset.
These ratios determine whether there is adequate
provision inthe tax code forthe anticipated net cost of
asset replacement (net of scrap value). The fund is
exactlyadequate ifthe ratio equals 1.0. Ratios less than
1.0 indicate that the kind is inadequate, and implicit
subsidies are present in ratios that exceed LO. The
ratios are computed for a variety of depreciation
schedules, both straight-line and accelerated. TheAc-
celerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) mandated by
ERTA and modified by TEFRA also is included in the
table; ACRS-ERTA is based on the 150 1DB method.
ACRS-TEFBA is ACRS-ERTA with the reduction in de-
preciation base — 50 percent of the investment tax
credit — mandated by TEFBA.”
The table suggests that, even at an inflation rate as
high as 9 percent, the present value of depreciation
deductions is sufficient to provide for replacement of
assets with tax lives up to 10 years under any of the
schedules; with two exceptions, this also holds for 15-
year assets. While the ratios are lower under current
law (‘t’EFBA) than under prior law, they remain ade-
quate for replacement funding. In marked contrast, for
themost durable assets — those with 30-year lifetimes
which are, generally, structures and other plant — the
deductions are inadequate evenat an inflation rate as
low as 3 percent. While the more accelerated depreci-
ation schedules, 200 DB and SYD, appear to overcome
this shortfall, structures and plant were restricted,
before ERTA, to using 150 DB> Consequently, for in-
vestment in plant, depreciation deductions were woe-
fully inadequate to provide for replacement at the in-
flation rates experienced in the United States over the
“More accelerated versions of ACRS were mandated by ERTA for
1985(175 percent decliningbalance) and for 1986 and beyond (200
percent declining balance); however, these later changes were re-
pealed by TEFRA> See Tax EquiP,, and Fiscal Responsibilify Act of
1982, pp. 40—43>
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15 years preceding ERTA. Aswe shall seebelow, one of tion deductions combined with the investment tax
ERTA’sclearest impacts has been to recti~’this short- credit have been sufficient to provide for replacement.
fall fol structures. Yet, included in these entries is the after-tax portion of
the asset’s anticipated scrap or salvage value> That is,
The Uncertain Eject ofAnticipated for example, the replacement of an electric typewriter
Salvage Value is in part financed by the anticipated sale of the old,
used typewriter. Yet, the inclusion ofsuch anticipated
For assets with tax lives under 15 years, the entries scrap value in the investment decision entails signifi-
in table 1 suggest that the present value of deprecia- cant risks: technological obsolescence, econonuc ob-
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solescence due to changes in relative prices and (in
the case of structures) locational obsolescence. The
first of these is exemplified by the widespread use of
word-processing machines, which has reduced the
value of even the most sophisticated electric type-
writers. The second can be appreciated by consider-
ing the effect of the mid-1970s’ run-up in oil and gas
prices on the value of standard-sized American used
cars.The third is an obvious risk entailed in purchas-
ing any commercial, industrial or residential struc-
ture. Moreover, each ofthese risks rises with the dura-
bility of the asset.’7
Because scrap value is so uncertain, especially for
longer-lived assets, it is informative to recompute the
ratios in table I without scrap value. The results are
shown in table 2.Without scrap value, the most accel-
erated depreciation schedules under prior law were
adequate for replacement except for assets of 10- or
15-year tax lives at 9 percent inflation and 30-year
assets atany inflation rate. Under current tax law (TE-
FBA), however, even three-year assets in the face of
moderate inflation, say 6 percent, could not have their
replacement financed through depreciation deduc-
tions alone.
Nonetheless, the shorter is the asset life, thesmaller
is the riskentailed in theanticipated scrapvalue; thus,
athree-year asset (for example, an automobile or light
truck according to the tax code) surely does have a
more secure resale market than, say, an asset with a
seven-year life (forexample, accounting, computing or
other office equipment). Consequently, the ratios pre-
sented in tables I and 2 should be interpreted as
defining a range ofuncertainty within which the spe-
cific values of particular assets can be considered in
“That is, suppose that there is a 1 percent likelihood that during any
singleyear an innovation in technology will make an existing asset’s
value decline due to the improvements in newer machines. Then,
the probability that an investment will nothave its scrap value low-
ered is 97 percent for a three-year asset, 90 percent for a 10-year
asset and 74 percent for a 30-year asset.
Further, consider the uncertainty associated with relative prices.
Every manufacturing process makes use of a variety of inputs —
labor, various raw materials and energy — so that the optimal
design based on existing technology of a machine used in that
process will depend on the relative prices of the inputs. Suppose
that the likelihood during any single year of a significant change in
relative input prices (sufficient to induce an alteration in capital
design) is 1 percent and is independent ofthe likelihood of techno-
logical innovation> Then, the probability that an asset’s salvage
value will not be lowered by either event is 94 percent for a three-
year asset, 82 percent for a 10-year asset and only 55 percent for a
30-year asset.
Finally, if we add a third source of obsolescence, the problem of
neighborhood declineor a change in locational usepatterns, also an
independent likelihood of 1 percent, this final obsolescence risk
which is peculiar to structurescauses the 30-year asset probability
of no decline in salvage value to plummet to 40 percent.
relation to their depreciation allowances and scrap
values.
Shortened Tax Lives under ACPLS and
the Impact on Specf/icAsset 1)pes
Although ERTA contains a bewildering array offea-
tures, the principal changes to prior tax laware lower
personal income tax rates, changes to gift and estate
tax rules, incentives for savingand the ACRS deprecia-
tion deduction schedules. In the context of deprecia-
tion, the primary impact of TEFRA was to repeal the
more accelerated ACRS schedules, which would have
become effective in 1985 and 1986, and to reduce the
depreciable asset base by one-half of the ITC. ACRS
under either ERTAor TEFRA,as tables I and 2show, is
not as accelerated for a given tax life as were some
options available earlier — for example, 200 1DB and
SYD. The major impact of ERTA, however, was in
shortening the tax life ofassets, an impact not revealed
by either ofthese tables.
Under ERTA, fourACRS schedules replaced the vari-
ous options available to asset owners under prior
law” The older system was based on surveys con-
ducted by the U.S. Treasury Department from which
asset life distributions were computed. The system
based on these distributions, called the Asset Depreci-
ation Range system (ADR), was the basis for deterrnin-
ing the tax life overwhich an asset could be depreci-
ated using thevarious deduction formulas.”
The new system, ACRS, replaced more than 100
classes ofasset lives with four: 3-year, 5-year, 10-year
and 15-year. The 3-year class primarily contains auto-
mobiles, light trucks and research equipment. Most
equipment is included in the 5-yearclass.The 10-year
class primarily comprises specialized machinery of
the public utility industry. All structures and some
other utilities’ capital are in the 15-year class.” Thus,
the acceleration of the depreciation allowance under
ERTA relative toprior tax law is not due to theformula
applied.” Rather, the saving is primarily due to a pro-
“See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, pp> 6—7, 67—68, and 75=
85.
“In particular, the 30th percentile of the survey responses was the
minimum allowable tax life.
“Certain manufactured housing and tank cars also fall into the 10-
year class. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, pp. 78—80.
“The schedules for equipment are based on 150DB with a switch to
straight line at the deduction optimizing point (see insert). There is a
half-year convention in these schedules — the asset is assumed to
be acquired at mid-year sothe initial year’s depreciation is one-half
of the 150DB schedule in the insert> The ACRS schedule forstruc-
tures is 175 DB with a switch to straight line at year 8; the structures’
schedules are specific to the month of asset acquisition. See frco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, pp. 40—41.
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nounced shortening ofthe taxlives ofeach asset class.
The mean reductions in asset tax lives from ADR to
ACRS for equipment and for structures were, respec-
tively, 44 percent and 49 percent.” The reductions in
tax lifetimes varied widely. The tax life of the three-
year class was shortened by only half ayear from ADR
to ACRS, but for longer-lived assets, the reductions
included 22.5years forcommercial structures (15-year
category), 4.7 years for aircraft (five-year category) and
5.5 years for railroad equipment (10-year category).
Thus, in evaluating the adequacy of depreciation
deductions in providing for replacement of any spe-
cificasset, there are sixelements to be considered: the
depreciation schedule, the anticipated inflation rate,
the asset’s tax life, its investment tax credit, economic
“Computed from ADR data by producers’ equipment and structures
classes in table 1 ofGravelle (1982).
lifeand scrap value. The effects of these elements are
revealed in the ratios of depreciation to replacement
cost for specific assets in table 3.
Column ao ftable 3 lists the specific asset types
analyzed; the nine assets were selected to cover a
variety ofeconomic depreciation rates, durability and
ACRS tax lives, which are reported in columns b, cand
d, respectively, for each asset. Column e lists the in-
flation rate assumed in each ratio, the range of rates
being the same as in tables I and 2. In the next three
columns, the ratio of the present values of deprecia-
tion, ITC and after-tax salvage value to economic de-
preciation and scrap value are reported; the ratios are
computed under prior tax law in column f, under
ERTA in column g and under TEFRA in column h.
Columns i and j display the ratio of the entries in
columns g and h to column f; if the ratio is greater
(less) than 1.0, then the tax treatment under ERTA or
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TEFRA has increased (decreased) the valueofdepreci- reduction in the depreciable base mandated by TE-
ation for that asset. Notice that for structures, FRA does not affect structures.
columns gandh are combined as are columns iand j;
this reflects the fact that investments in structures do Scanning down the columns of ratios in columns f—j
not quality for ITC, and, thus, the 50 percent of ITC oftable 3 provides an overall assessment ofthe impact
26on depreciation adequacy under ERTA and TEFRA
relative to prior tax law> Column freiterates the gen-
eral message of table I for specific assets — namely
that equipment, especially shorter-lived equipment
such as automobiles, was more than adequately pro-
vided for under the prior tax law, while structures’
depreciation deductions wereinadequate at even low
inflation rates>Columns g and h show that the new tax
laws have reduced thebenefits offast depreciation for
short-lived equipment, but sharply raised these
benefits for structures at all inflation rates. Forexam-
ple, at a 6 percent inflation rate, the depreciation ratio
for office, computing and accounting equipment de-
clines from 1.135 under prior tax law to 1.081 under
TEFRA, while for industrial structures it rises from
0.660 to 1-045. Finally, the entries in columns i and j
affirm that longer-lived assets havehad their deprecia-
tion ratios reduced less or increased more than
shorter-lived assets. For example, comparing the ra-
tios in column j at a 6percent inflation rate, communi-
cations equipment has 0.978 of itsprior tax law depre-
ciation ratio under TEFRA, while the shorter-lived
asset aircraft has 0.966and the longer-lived asset com-
mercial structures has 1.580.
In summary, the ratios in column h reveal that the
shift to ACRS has provided inducements to purchase
new capital equipment that rise with the durability of
the equipment. Moreover, relative to prior law
(column j), the additional incentives are especially
strong for nonresidential structures, particularly at
low inflation rates. Compared with prior tax law, ACRS
diminishes the deleterious effects of inflation on the
value of depreciation deductions for long-lived assets
and reduces the attractiveness of investments in
equipment relative to structures. For example, the
present value of the depreciation deductions plus
scrap for industrial structures under ACRS is greater
than the present value of the replacement cost at in-
flation rates up to 6 percent; moreover, thedeductions
are increased massively relative to prior tax law at all
inflation rates.” In particular, the ratios for industrial
structures in column h exceed those for automobiles
and aircraft at low inflation rates where, as column f
shows, the ranking was the reverse under prior law>
The Combined Effects ofTax Changes
and Disinflation in the 1980s
To focus only on the changes in the depreciation
schedules and their effects on various assets at any
“In part, this higher present value of depreciation deductions is offset
by the lack of investment tax credit on investment in nonresidential
structures. Moreover,the tax act of 1984 haslengthenedthe depre-
ciation term (or structuresfrom 15 to 18 years, which will slightly
reduce theimpetus. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, p. 178.
specific inflation rate understates the investment in-
centives provided by the changes in the 1980s. The
reduction in the observed inflation rate and, presum-
ably, the anticipated inflation rates over the invest-
ment term provide another strong impetus. For exam-
ple,the rate ofinflation measured by the implicit GNP
deflator has been falling over the past four years —
from an average i-ate ofover 9 percent during 1978—Si
to between 3 and 4 percent dunng 1982—84. Conse-
quently, the most pertinent assessment ofthe impact
on investment incentives afforded by this substantial
decline in the inflation rate is to compare (using the
data in table 3) the ratio of depreciation to replace-
ment cost under pre-ERTA schedules at 9 percent
inflation with the ratios for- 6 percent inflation under
TEFRA. These inflation rates approximate the ex-
pected inflation rates, based on survey data, which
prevailed in late 1980 and late 1984, respectively.’~
When this comparison is made for comniunications
equipment, the ratio rises from 1.150 to 1.224 instead
ofdeclining. In thecase ofautomobiles, this enhanced
comparison shows a slight decline — from 1207 to
1.168 — while in the case of industrial structures it





Asshown above, there are two sources of distortion
in depreciation deductions: On the one hand, they
may provide more expense deduction than required
for the eventual replacement of the used-up asset.
This can result either from a shortening of the tax life
below the span ofits economic usefulness, or from an
acceleration of the deductions. On the other- hand,
they may be inadequate to provide for the purchase of
the replacement asset given a rise in its nominal price
due to inflation. That is, since the deductions are
based on the purchase price — its historical cost —
inflation will progressively make the depreciation al-
lowance inadequate for the purchase of the replace-
ment.
As shown in tables 1 and 2, these two distortions
work in opposition. For example, in table I consider
‘4The short-term (one-year period) expected inflation rate in June
1980 was 10.22 percent and 5.47 percent in June 1984; these
estimates are from a semi-annual survey ofeconomistsconducted
by Joseph Livingston of The Philadelphia Inquirer, as revised by
Carlson (1977). The long-term (10-year period) expected inflation
rate in October 1980 was 8.82 percent and had fallen to 5>79 per-
cent in October 1984; these estimates are from a decision-makers
poll conducted by Richard B. Hoey of Drexel Bumham Lambert,
Incorporated.
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Chart 3
Depreciation Distortion and the Growth Rate






the effect of increasing acceleration on the ratio of
depreciation to replacement cost for a 10-yearasset at
a 6 percent inflation rate:as the depreciation schedule
is accelerated from SL to 150 DR to 200 DB, the ratio
rises from 1.173 to 1.208 to 1.255, an increase ofnearly 7
percent. Conversely, consider the impact of rising in-
flation on the 10-year asset’s ratio under 200 DB: as
inflation rises from 3 percent to 9 pereent, the ratio
falls from 1.362 to 1.163, adecrease of over17 percent.
Consequently, therateofinvestmentshould varyposi-
tivelywith the net distortion of depreciation — that is,
the difference between these two opposing distor-
tions.
This association, in fact, can be seen in chart 3
which displays thegrowth rate of thecapital stock and
the ratio of the Capital Consumption Adjustment
(CCA) to estimated economic depreciation for U.S.
nonfinancial corporations beginning 1955. CCA, as
estimated by the Commerce Department, is the dif-
ference between depreciation claimed by corpora-
tions on their tax returns and the estimated “eco-
nomic depreciation” of their capital equipment; the
Commerce Department defines economic deprecia-
tion as straight-line depreciation with an adjustment
(an increase in the depreciable base) for inflation. By
computing the ratio ofCCA to economic depreciation,
we obtain a proportional measure of depreciation
distortion.
Chart 3 reveals important characteristics of the last
30 years’ capital stock growth rates. First, the interval
of highest capital stock growth over the period coin-
cided with the interval during which the CCA ratio
was highest — from late 1961 through early 1974.”
From mid-1973 through early 1982, CCA was negative,
hence its ratiowas below zero, and capital growth was
~Thesimple correlationcoefficient between thevariables in chart 3 is
.42, significantatthe .0001 level.However, the association appears
tohave changed during the 1981—82 recession: from 1955—80, the
correlation was .65, significant at .0001, but from 1981 —84 it was
— .08 and insignificant.Vet the sharprise of CCA during the 1981—
82 recession, due to disinflation and ERTA, isoutofkeeping with its
behavior in the earlier recessions shown in chart 3. During the
1969—70 and 1973—74 recessions, CCA fellsharply and during the
1980 recession it was roughly constant. The other two recessions,
1957—58 and 1960—61, during which CCA rose moderately, had,
like the current recovery, much sharper upturns in capital growth
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Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Li Two-quarter moving average.
L2 Twelve>quorter moving overage>
Shaded areas represent periods of business recessions.
correspondingly slower. Second, capital stockgrowth
appears to followthe growth rate of real output: it rises
throughout expansions and plummets in recessions,
ceteris paribus. Thus, the two pronounced non-reces-
sion declines in capital growth in chart 3 — 1955—56
and 1966—67 — each occurred inyears when substan-
tial slowdowns in the growth rate of real output oc-
curred — year-over-year declines of 4.6 percent and
3.3 percent, respectively. Third, the sharpest rise in
capital stock growth in any singleyear occurred in
1983 coincidentwith the largest rise in the proportion
of CCAto economic depreciation.
A second qualitative indication ofthe effects of dis-
tortion in depreciation deductions is its impact on the
relative share of investment devoted to structures. As
is clear from tables I or 2, underprior tax law, invest-
ment in structures was penalized — in the sense of
lowering the ratio of depreciation deductions to re-
placement cost — by sustained inflation relatively
more thaninvestment in shorter-lived assets.Asa con-
sequence, it isnot surprising thatperiods ofsustained
high inflation are also periods in which investment in
structures is relatively low.” Chart 4 depicts the pro-
portion oftotal U.S. nonresidential investment innon-
residential structures and the rate of inflation since
1955. As expected, investment in plant has been pro-
portionally lowest during periods of relatively high
and sustained inflation. The enhanced incentives for
investment in structures displayed in table 3 and the
drop in the inflation rate suggest that the structures’
share of investment should rise from its currently low
proportion.
CONCLUSIONS
Elementary capital theory implies that lowering
taxes on capital by increasing the acceleration of de-
2eNelson (1976), pp. 928—30, develops the simple analytics of this
proposition, which are that the present values of shorter-lived proj-
ects rise relative to longer-lived ones, as implied by the data in
tables 1, 2 and 3. The simple correlation between the variables in
chart 4 during 1955—84 is — .89, significant at the .0001 level. More-
over, a regression of the plant share variable on the Livingston 6-
month expected inflation rate yields a coefficient of — 1.81, signifi-
cant at the .0001 level.
70 72 14 76 78 80 82 1984
System and U.S. Department of Commerce
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preciation deductions or shortening the term over
which depreciation i5 taken raises thevalue of capital
and, other things the same, raises the rate of invest-
ment. The tax reductions in ERTA consisted primarily
of a shortening of the tax lifetimes over which assets
are depreciated; the changes in TEFBA, while repeal-
\ing the more accelerated depreciation schedules that
would have followed in 1985 and 1986, left intact the
basic shortening of asset tax lives. This lowered the
portion of net proceeds on which corporationswould
pay taxes and raised thevalue ofcapital.
Yet, the rise in investment occurring since the en-
actment of ERTA cannot be attributed solely to faster
acceleration ofdeductions orshorter tax lives. In large
part, the rise in CCA since 1980 has been due to the
sharp decline in the inflation rate from about 9 per-
cent to about 3 to 4percent and theassociated decline
in inflation expectations. Previously, sustained shifts
in the inflation rate also have been associated, in-
versely, with changes in the rate of capital stock
growth. Part ofthe rapid rise in capital stockgrowth in
1983 may be due to the proximity and severity of the
1980 and 1981—82 recessions. In no other recovery,
however, has capital growth risen as rapidiy oras long
as in the current expansion.
Since, in the case ofmost intermediate-lived capital
equipment, the ACRS-TEFBA depreciation schedules
are actually less accelerated than those allowed under
prior tax law, ACRS could explain neither the recent
rise in CCA nor in capital growth in chart 3. Yet, ifthe
decline in inflation expectations continues to follow
the decline in observed inflation, then the value of
depreciation deductions willhavebeen raised by 10 to
20 percent for most equipment and by more than 100
percent for structures.’7 Thus, the impacts of the 1981
and 1982 tax acts have been augmented by the sub-
stantial decline in the inflation rate since 1980 and,
more important, the change in investors’ expectations
75pecifically, the increases in the ratios ofdepreciation and scrap to
replacement cost as inflation declines from 9 percent to 3 percent
(from table 3,columns f and h) are: autos, 1 .7 percent; office equip-
ment, 9.4 percent; aircraft, 11>9 percent; mining and oil field equip-
ment, 11.8 percent; communications equipment, 14.1 percent;
ships and boats, 32.0 percent; railroad equipment, 18.5 percent;
commercial structures, 125>1 percent; industrial structures, 129.4
percent>
about what inflation rate policymakers will bring
about in the future. Without question, the renewed
vigor ofcorporate investment is due toboth sources of
effective tax reductions — ACRS and the lower rate of
inflation>”
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“TheEconomic Report of the President (1984) is also clear on this
apportioned credit:
The tax climate for business investment has also been substantially
improved in the past 3 years> During the 1970s the rising rateof inflation
combined with the old depreciation rules to raise very substantially the
tax rate on the income from investment in business plant and equip-
ment> The 1981 changes in the tax rules governing depreciation, as
modified in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, and the sharp
reduction in inflation reducedthis effectivetax rate substantially> (p. 34)>
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